school in econometrics' by Christopher Gilbert (1986) 2 . Leamer was discussant and
David Levy was presiding this session. article 'What will take the con out of econometrics?' 3 , and the foundation of Econometric Theory by Peter C.B. Phillips.
Phillips was not only the founder of Econometric Theory but also its editor since its first issue published in 1985 till today. The first issue contains an extensive Editorial explaining the editorial policy objectives of this journal. It is remarkable that to four obvious objectives, he added two historical aims:
5. To publish historical studies on the evolution of econometric thought and on the subject's early scholars. In its present stage of evolution, the subject of econometrics is still visibly rooted in the historical tradition that slowly took shape in the early years of this century, which gained definite form in the work of Frisch and Tinbergen in the 1930s and crystallized in the studies of
Haavelmo and the research of the Cowles Commission during the 1940s, the latter very largely under the inspiration of Marschak and Koopmans. Many of us have much to learn from this historical tradition and from the talents, concerns, and achievements of these forerunners of present day econometrics.
Happily, this field of research in the history of thought is now under development. In support of this field, ET wishes to encourage the publication of articles that explore the nature of this historical tradition, examine the evolution of econometric thought from its foundation research, and study the subject's early scholars. […] 6. To publish high-level professional interviews with leading econometricians.
[…] These in-depth interviews will offer the opportunity of a wide ranging personal commentary on major schools of thought and reveal individual insights into the evolution and the present state of econometric research.
Through these interviews the econometrics community will be able to learn more about the human side of research discovery and come to understand the genesis of the subject's main ideas from some of its finest minds. Most particularly, those readers who have not had the benefit of personal contact with some of our leading econometricians may now have the opportunity to hear their voices, not only on matters concerned with their own research, but also on their intellectual background and influences and on their methods of teaching and research. It is hoped that these interviews will awaken an intellectual excitement in new and prospective generations of econometricians and will encourage them to make the fullest use of their own talents. (Phillips 1985, 4) These are many facts to show that in 1985 there was close mutual interaction of history of economics, philosophy of science and econometrics. This interaction Strikingly, this volume starts with a (historical) overview (by Aris Spanos) of different approaches "that should encourage though, discussion, and perhaps some controversy", a chapter (by Kevin Hoover) on methodology "generally absent from textbooks" and two on the history of econometrics (by Richard W. Farebrother and Gilbert and Qin) .
As a matter of fact this volume on the history of econometrics before us also originated due to a close interaction with econometricians. The North American
Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society at Duke University in June 2007 hadfor the first time -a session on the history of econometrics, organised by Weintraub.
The session was a success: "The history session was well attended and the discussion was lively. Although the audience was almost entirely practitioners rather than historians" (Hoover 2010, 20) . An outcome of this discussion was that the editors of HOPE and the session participants started to consider whether it would be useful and feasible to have a conference on its own on the history of econometrics.
To investigate its feasibility, Boumans started to survey the literature on contributions on the history of econometrics to see who the earlier contributors were and whether they were still active to find out whether a critical mass of historians would be interested "to turn up the heat and bring the history of econometrics back to the forefront of the field" (Hoover 2010, 19) . Surveying the literature it soon became clear that the interest in the history of econometrics arose from within econometrics itself, and that its histories are mainly written by econometricians. Only a few papers on econometrics were written by historians of economics. According to Weintraub (1985) this was a "scandal":
it is obvious that historians of economic thought must be comfortable with modern work in economics. That is, the history of economic thought should not exclude an interest in the tools of mathematics, econometrics, and "modern high theory." It is a minor scandal that there is no comprehensive history of either the rise of econometrics or the mathematization of economics. (Weintraub 1985, 10) But he only rectified this scandal partly; his own study was on the history of mathematical economics only. So, on the one hand, one can be pleased that the histories of econometrics are at least written by the econometricians themselves, but on the other hand, this leads therefore to all kinds of unintended but nevertheless unavoidable historiographic biases. As will be discussed below, one reason for econometricians to be interested in history is that history can be used to delineate econometrics, that is, to set its disciplinary boundaries, with respect to its aim, its methods, its scientific values, etc. The risk is that history is used to legitimize set boundaries, while actually these boundaries should be historicized. Another problem with history as a means to delineate is that most histories are written from the perspective of econometrics as a separate science, and so they are constructed separate from the histories of connected disciplines like mathematics, economics, statistics, computer science, physics, engineering, biometrics, psychometrics, genetics, accountancy, actuarial sciences, etc. Moreover, delineating history has also a blind spot for applied research where disciplinary boundaries are usually blurred, but also a blind spot for what is happening outside the geographic areas of appointed founding fathers. Most histories give the impression that econometrics is a European-North-American science ignoring developments in the rest of the world. The conference aim was to rectify these historiographic biases by inviting contributions to these issues; the subsequent chapters are a result of this invitation.
Chart Session
Another goal of the conference was to gain some understanding of the historical background of these histories on econometrics, to get at a history of the histories of econometrics so to say. Questions like where this interest of econometricians in the history of econometrics came from, why historians of economics might be interested in econometrics or not, were questions we wished to have addressed at the conference.
A way to deal with these questions was to take the advantage that the HOPE conferences would be held at Duke University where several of the 1985 characters had and have their (temporary) home office. The original idea was to have a 'witness seminar' with the 1980s witnesses. A witness seminar is a seminar "where several people associated with a particular set of circumstances or events are invited to meet together to discuss, debate, and even disagree about their reminiscences" (Tansey 1997 Keynes's (1939) critique was that the technique of multiple correlation analysis which had been adopted by Tinbergen was solely a method for measurement. It contributed nothing in terms of either discovery or testing.
The implication was that if the economic theorist does not provide the modeler with a complete set of causal factors, then the measurement of the other causal factors will be biased. Moreover, Keynes argued that some significant factors in any economy are not capable of measurement, or may be interdependent. Another of Keynes's concerns was the assumed linearity of the relations between these factors. He also noted that the determination of time-lags and trends was too often based on trial and error, and too little informed by theory. And last but not least was the problem of invariance: would the relations found also hold for the future? These questions remained central to the subsequent debate.
Taking into account all of these concerns and Tinbergen's responses to them, Keynes came to the conclusion that econometrics was not yet a scientific approach:
No one could be more frank, more painstaking, more free from subjective bias or parti pris than Professor Tinbergen. There is no one, therefore, so far as human qualities go, whom it would be safer to trust with black magic. That there is anyone I would trust with it at the present stage or that this brand of statistical alchemy is ripe to become a branch of science, I
am not yet persuaded. But Newton, Boyle and Locke all played with Alchemy. So let him continue. (Keynes 1940, 156) Hendry labelled Keynes's list of concerns as "problems of the linear regression model", which, according to him consisted of: using an incomplete set of determining factors (omitted variables bias), building models with unobservable variables (such as expectations), estimated from badly measured data based on index numbers, obtaining spurious correlations from the use of proxy variables and simultaneity, being unable to separate the distinct effects of multicollinear variables, assuming linear functional forms not knowing the appropriate dimensions of the regressors, mis-specifying the dynamic reactions and lag lengths, incorrectly pre-filtering the data, invalidly inferring causes from correlations, predicting inaccurately (non-constant parameters), confusing statistical with economic significance of results and failing to relate economic theory to econometrics. To Keynes's list of problems, he added: stochastic mis-specification, incorrect exogeneity assumptions, inadequate sample sizes, aggregation, lack of structural identification and an inability to refer back uniquely from observed empirical results to any given initial theory.
Hendry admitted that "It is difficult to provide a convincing case for the defence against Keynes's accusation almost 40 years ago that econometrics is statistical alchemy since many of his criticisms remain apposite" (Hendry 1980, 402 (Ericsson 2004, 780 ).
Hendry referred to Keynes's usage of the term alchemy to discuss the scientific nature of econometrics. Another way of denoting this discussion is to see how much econometrics differs from "economic tricks" (or "econo-mystics" or "icon-ometrics", see Hendry 1980, 388) . This characterization is based on a story by Carl F. Christ (1967, 155) :
I once had an urgent letter to dictate and, the Economics Department secretary being unavailable, I prevailed upon the secretary of the neighbouring Political Science Department to help. When I proof-read the typed copy, "econometrics" had been transformed to "economic tricks".
This story was probably the motivation for Leamer (1983) to contribute to the debate about the scientific character of econometrics under the title: "Let's take the con out of econometrics".
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Leamer's paper is very much about the "myth" of science that empirical research is (randomized controlled) experimentation and scientific inference is objective and free of personal prejudice. Though Leamer is ultimately proposing a Bayesian approach, he is using Lakatosian and Kuhnian notions to advocate such an approach. The problem of nonexperimental settings (usual the case in economics) compared to experimental settings ("routinely done" in science) is that "the misspecification uncertainty in many experimental settings may be so small that it is well approximated by zero. This can very rarely be said in nonexperimental settings" (Leamer 1983, 33) . Traditional econometrics seems not to admit this "experimental bias", and as such misspecification uncertainty functions as "Lakatos's 'protective belt' which protects certain hard core propositions from falsification" (34). So, projecting the image that econometrics is like agricultural experimentation (randomized controlled experimentation) is not only "grossly misleading" (31), but also leads, in Lakatosian terminology, to protecting a degenerating programme, which means pseudo-science like alchemy.
But also "the false idol of objectivity has done great damage to economic science" (36). If we want to make progress, according to Leamer, "the first step we must take is to discard the counterproductive goal of objective inference" (37). Inference is a logical conclusion based on facts, but because "the sampling distribution and the prior distribution are actually opinions and not facts, a statistical inference is and must forever remain an opinion" (37). Moreover, Leamer considers a fact as "merely an opinion held by all, or at least held by a set of people you regard to be a close approximation to all" (37). In a footnote he refers to Kuhn (1962) and Michael Polanyi's (1964) Personal Knowledge as a philosophical backing up for this notion of fact as "truth by consensus".
The problem of using opinions, however, is their "whimsical nature". An inference is not "believable" if it is fragile, if it can be reversed by minor change in assumptions.
It is thus the task of the econometrician to withhold belief until an inference is shown "to be adequately insensitive to the choice of assumptions" (43).
To prevent econometrics from becoming alchemy, Hendry, Leamer and Sims developed their own methodologies: the general-to-specific approach, the Bayesian approach and the VAR approach, respectively, leading to the debates of the mid 1980s. These well-known debates are all strikingly related to econometric methodology. The advantage of debates is that they are often less technical and so receive more attention from outside their field.
Delineation of Econometrics
This worry about developing an econometric methodology that can help to prevent economics to become a pseudo-science, the underlying motivation of the 1980s debate, is not so different from the motivation of the founding fathers of econometrics to design a program for turning economics into a science. 12 The beginnings and its subsequent development of econometrics are closely related to attempts of finding the most appropriate scientific empirical methodology for economics. According to Ragnar Frisch, who first coined the term econometrics in his very first paper in economics 'Sur un problème d'économique pure ' (1926) , the term means the unification of economic theory, statistics, and mathematics:
Intermediate between mathematics, statistics, and economics, we find a new discipline which, for the lack of a better name, may be called econometrics.
Econometrics has as its aim to subject abstract laws of theoretical political or "pure" economics to experimental and numerical verification, and thus to turn pure economics, as far as possible, into a science in the strict sense of the word. (Frisch 1971) In his first Editorial of the newly established journal Econometrica, Frisch (1933) gave an explanation of the term econometrics:
12 See Bjerkholt and Qin (2011a) for a more detailed history of the founding of the Econometric Society with the aim of "scientization" of economics.
Its definition is implied in the statement of the scope of the Society, in Section I of the Constitution, which reads: "The Econometric Society is an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. The Society shall operate as a completely disinterested, scientific organization without political, social, financial, or nationalistic bias. Its main object shall be to promote studies that aim at a unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking similar to what has come to dominate in the natural sciences." (Frisch 1933, 1) It is apparent that the underlying motivation for this "new discipline", from its beginning, was to turn economics "into a science", that is to penetrate economics by "constructive and rigorous thinking" dominant in the natural sciences.
Presumably, this is the reason Frisch and Tinbergen were awarded the first Nobel Prize in economics. As is well known, the Nobel Prize in economics is not a real
Nobel prize but the Central Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Memory of
Alfred Nobel instituted at the tercentenary celebration of the Swedish Central Bank.
The Central Bank approached the Nobel Foundation and the Royal Swedish Academy of Science (the awarding authority for the prizes in physics and chemistry) for agreement on the conditions and rules for the prize. "There was, however, a certain scepticism towards the new prize idea among some natural scientists in the Academy -partly because of a general reluctance to extend Nobel prizes to new fields, partly because of doubts whether a social science, such as economic, would be 'scientific' enough to warrant a prize of this kind on an equal footing with prizes in 'hard sciences' like physic and chemistry" (Lindbeck 1985, 37-38) . Because of this skepticism it is interesting to see that the first prize was awarded to two founders of econometrics: "Their aim has been to lend economic theory mathematical stringency, and to render it in a form that permits empirical quantification and a statistical testing of hypotheses. One essential object has been to get away from the vague, more 'literary' type of economics" (Lundberg 1992, 3) .
Econometrics was originally defined in accordance with its scientification program. Bresciani-Turroni, Jakob Marschak, Roos and Hans Staehle on (4). These surveys did not only inform the reader of Econometrica about "significant developments", but also to promote new theories, tools or methodologies. This tradition came to an end after six years.
Besides the already mentioned histories, bibliographies and surveys there are several contributions on the history of the Econometric Society by Divisia (1953) and Christ (1983) and on the Cowles Commission by Christ (1952 , 1977 and 1994 ), Clifford Hildreth (1986 and Epstein (1987) .
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The boiling points of interest in the history of econometrics were initiated by attempts to delineate the discipline, that is, to define its boundaries, and to identify the proper scientific approach. What we see is that this delineation is closely related to the images of science adhered in each period of interest. For Jevons and Fisher a scientific theory should be mathematical. Frisch's image of science, and of his contemporaries, can be identified as the scientific worldview of (Logical) Positivism. The science images playing a role in the methodological debates of the 1980s were those of Karl
Popper, Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn. These science images in each period played an important role in the delineation of econometrics and therefore cannot be detached from the written histories in each of these periods.
Weintraub's ("long struggle of escape" to find the most appropriate) historiography It seems that thinking about a historiography equipped for econometrics we have to take account of the econometricians' ideals of science. Philosophy of science is a discipline that studies these ideals. So, it seems obvious that a historiography focused on econometrics should be connected to philosophy of science. Despite the obviousness of this connection, it has not been investigated as much for econometrics, as it has been done for mathematical economics: In his various publications of the history of mathematical economics, Weintraub has written extensively about a historiography for mathematical economics in relation to philosophy of science. Weintraub's (1985) history of general equilibrium analysis sympathized with the developments in econometrics to look for "historical evidence pertaining to the development of the work they evaluate" (140). For that reason he quoted Lakatos's paraphrase of Kant: "Philosophy of science without the history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy is blind" (Lakatos 1971, 91) . Influenced by the philosophical views of that time, that is, of Kuhn and Lakatos, methodology should be historically informed, as also de Marchi and Gilbert (1989, 9) emphasized in their introduction to the special issue of the Oxford Economic Papers on the history and methodology of econometrics:
In fact methodology is inquiry into why the accepted is judged acceptable. But standards alter; and while methodology can be suggestive, its suggestions are offered only on the basis of an understanding of past and current practice and the reasons for it. Methodology thus shades imperceptibility into historical inquiry, and indeed cannot do otherwise. To be self-aware, however, practitioners must look to methodology of this historically informed sort.
But their philosophical framework itself was fixed, namely the developments were characterized as taking place within "Research Programmes in the strict (Lakatosian) sense" (5). The same applies to Weintraub's (1985) historical study of General Equilibrium Analysis, where he "argues that previous methodological investigations have been distorted by the use of inappropriate models taken from the philosophy of science that were developed to appraise work in physical sciences" (i), but nevertheless he took for granted that Lakatos's model of research programmes was appropriate for the study of mathematical economy.
However, the methodology used for reconstructing a development had, according to Lakatos, to be normative. He was quite explicit about this. Taking its cue from the above paraphrase of Kant's dictum, Lakatos's (1971) paper on the history of science intended to explain:
how the historiography of science should learn from the philosophy of science and vice versa. It will be argued that (a) philosophy of science provides normative methodologies in terms of which the historian reconstructs 'internal history' and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth of objective knowledge; (b) two competing methodologies can be evaluated with the help of (normatively interpreted) history; (c) any rational reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-psychological) 'external history'. (Lakatos 1971, 91) As a result "each internal history has its characteristic victorious paradigms" (93).
For Weintraub this was -a few years later -the main reason no longer to tell "the story of twentieth century economics as the rise and fall, or the progress or degeneration, of various scientific research programs in economics" (Weintraub 2002, 262) . History should be done from "a perspective based not on asking of how science should be done, but rather how it was and is done" (267). This is the so-called naturalistic turn: to understand science, whether historically, philosophically, sociologically or economically, one should look at its practice as it is actually done. But, as Weintraub rightly admits: there can be "no escape from 'frameworks.' There is no view from nowhere, no platforms on which I, the historian, can stand apart and aloof from the materials on which I work" (Weintraub 2002, 269 We may distinguish, broadly speaking, two sorts of questions concerning every scientific discipline. The first sort are questions about the subject matter of the discipline. The second sort are questions about the discipline qua discipline, or second-order questions. It is the aim of a discipline to answer the questions of the first sort, but usually not to answer questions of the second sort. These second-order questions concern the methodology, philosophy, history, or sociology of the discipline and are usually addressed by ancillary disciplines. (Corry 1989, 411) .
The body of knowledge includes all those contents related to the subject matter of the given discipline, these are its theories, facts, methods and open problems. This division between the body and image of knowledge is not sharp and is historically determined. The answers to the second-order questions depend on the contents of the body of knowledge at a given stage of development of the discipline.
Moreover, changes in the body of knowledge may alter these answers. But these answers are not exclusively determined by the body of knowledge; they may be influenced by other, external factors as well. In turn, the image of knowledge plays a decisive role in directing research and further determining the development of the body of knowledge. They constantly interact dynamically.
Corry's motivation for this distinction is that the study of the interaction between these two "layers" might provide a coherent explanation of the effect of sociohistorical factors on the realm of pure ideas, while avoiding dubious "strong" explanations that overemphasize the effects of these factors. Such explanations, which attribute the content of theories to factors absolutely external to them, lead unavoidably (and sometimes intentionally) to relativism. (Corry 1989, 412) Of relevance to understand the history of econometrics is Corry's discussion of how mathematics is different from the other exact sciences: "mathematics is the only exact science in which statements about the discipline may still be inside the discipline" Using Corry's categories to characterize the role of history in econometrics, it seems that history of econometrics is used as reflexive econometric knowledge, but in contrast to mathematics, its is thinking about econometrics that is not an integral part of the econometric body of knowledge but takes place where the body of knowledge and the images of knowledge interact dynamically. Corry states that second-order questions, which concern methodology and history, are "usually addressed by ancillary disciplines" (411), except mathematics due to its reflexive character, but what we saw is that econometricians also address these questions, and that it has been hardly taken over by "ancillary" disciplines.
History of Econometrics as Reflexive Knowledge
As a result of "a renewed interest in econometric methodology" and "the articulation of many distinctive viewpoints about empirical modelling and the credibility of econometric evidence" (Hendry 1986, xi) in the 1980s, econometricians like Hendry and Spanos felt the need to bridge the gap between the textbook econometric theory techniques "in all their formal glory" and the ad hoc procedures empirical researchers had to resort to: "Econometrics textbooks encouraged the 'myth' that the main ingredients for constructing good empirical econometric models were a 'good' theoretical model and a menu of estimators (OLS, GLS, 2SLS, LIML, IV, 3SLS, FIML)" (Spanos 1986, xv) .
To set up a new methodology, the first section of the first chapter of Spanos's (1986) textbook 'Statistical Foundations of Econometric Modelling' (with a foreword by Hendry), starts with a "brief historical overview" to delineate its intended scope. Its more recent histories of econometrics: Hendry and Morgan (1995)
Conclusions
Corry's distinction between the body and image of a science can so provide an understanding of the history of econometrics and its own continuing struggle with its boundaries. The changes and developments of the econometrician's image of science, that is, inclusive their perception of the views of the philosophers of science at a relevant period, can help to clarify the development of econometrics. In other words, understanding the development of econometrics as a modern science also asks for understanding of the development of the image of science, which includes the history of philosophy of science and the history of economic methodology. Beside that philosophers of science need to be historically informed, historians of science need to be philosophical informed, which mean more precisely here that they need to be informed about the developments of the philosophical ideas about science. To paraphrase Lakatos: "Philosophy of science without the history of science is empty;
history of science without the history of philosophy is blind".
Corry's distinction between the body and image of knowledge does not only provide a framework to write histories of econometrics, but also to write a history of these histories. From its beginnings, econometricians have considered historical knowledge as reflexive knowledge useful to delineate their discipline. As such the histories written in each period reflect the image of their discipline in that period. We saw that in the 1930s, when mathematics was still considered to be an essential component of econometrics, many histories referred to the "mathematico-economic" roots, by surveying this literature but also by denominating mathematical economists as forerunners. Cournot, Pareto and Walras do not appear in any current history of econometrics. Each period has its own list of forerunners and founding fathers.
In the post-war period till the 1980s, history of econometrics was the history of Cowles Commission econometrics. This only changed when in the 1970s the limits of the Cowles program became visible and "young turks" like Hendry, Leamer and Sims started to develop alternative programs. These new programs initiated histories of areas "before" and "beside" the Cowles program. Econometrics today is much more considered as statistics applied to economic data, which is reflected by the increased attention for histories of statistics in relation to the history of econometrics and with a more prominent role of R.A. Fisher. We leave it to future historians to delineate the kind of econometrics that is reflected by this volume, we are simply too close to it to see it.
